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Abstract
Enforcing strong authentication is an option to mit-
igate phishing. However, existing authentication
methods, like traditional digital signatures, require
unrealistic full deployment of public key infrastruc-
ture(PKI) and destroy email users’ privacy in that the
identity of an email sender is automatically revealed
to the public. There have been some works in the lit-
erature, where the technology of deniable authentica-
tion is adopted and sender’s privacy can be protected.
However, the additional computation introduced into
the system is obviously a drawback. In this paper,
we introduce the notion of online/offline authentica-
tion into anti-phishing, in order to construct an ef-
ficient and secure anti-phishing scheme. It is com-
monly known that a generic online/offline signature
can be constructed with a traditional chameleon func-
tion. Nevertheless, a standard chameleon function
suffers from so-called key-exposure attacks. To tackle
this issue, we propose an efficient chameleon func-
tion without key-exposure, which is especially suit-
able for constructing efficient online/offline signa-
tures that are applicable to mitigating phishing. We
also demonstrate how to apply our novel scheme to a
traditional email system.
Keywords: Anti-Phishing, Online/Offline Signature,
Identity-Based System, Chameleon Hash Function.
1 Introduction
Email systems are essential components of the Inter-
net infrastructure. As an asynchronous communica-
tion medium, email systems provide a free and ex-
tremely fast delivery service, which makes it become
the most popular application on the Internet. With
the growth of the Internet, numerous email servers
have been established on the Internet. However, se-
curity attacks in email systems have also increased.
The worst one is email-based phishing, which is de-
signed to lead recipients to official-looking spoof web-
sites in order to trick them into divulging their per-
sonal and financial information. The number of the
victims and the cost of these attacks increased each
year (Anti-Phishing. 1989). Despite the use of vari-
ous technologies against phishing, it is still one of the
most serious attacks against Internet users. More-
over, phishing attacks become more sophisticated re-
cently. The reason of phishing attacks flooding on
the Internet is SMTP (Simple Mail Transfer Protocol
(Postel 1982)), the core technology of e-mail system,
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was designed without consideration of the sender ad-
dress’s authenticity.
To provide a solution to mitigating email phishing
attacks, we are concerned with the following issues:
1. Practicalness: Deployment is easy and realistic.
2. Authenticity: An email is really from the origin
address as it claimed.
3. Non-repudiation: An email sender can not deny
that he has sent the email, while a judge deals
with the case of a dispute.
4. Non-Transferability: the recipient can not con-
vince others that the sender actually sent the
message. This provides the sender’s privacy as
in the conventional mail system.
Strong authentication based on digital signatures
has been considered for mitigating phishing in the
literature (Anti-Phishing.). The idea of using digi-
tal signatures obviously works since they allow email
recipients to check whether or not a sender is gen-
uine. However, using a traditional signature scheme
does not provide a desirable solution to email sys-
tems, since it destroys user privacy that is enjoyed
by Internet users. By user privacy, we mean that
in a traditional email system, an email sender can
deny that he or she has sent a message to the pub-
lic since email address does not provide any authen-
tication to the sender and the message at all. This
privacy is enjoyed by email users in current email sys-
tems. Therefore, we have to find a suitable way. Con-
trary to a traditional signature based authentication
scheme, deniable authentication (Dwork et al. 1998)
provides a useful property we can make use of. Using
a scheme of deniable authentication, an email sender
can convince a specific recipient that he is indeed the
sender, while his identity remains ambiguous to oth-
ers. The idea of deniable authentication for mitigat-
ing phishing is not new. There are several published
works in the literature (Susilo et al. 2004, 2003, Naor
2002). Very recently, identity based deniable authen-
tication has also been developed for applications in
anti-phishing (Ren et al. 2007). All above mentioned
schemes have a drawback of additional computational
overhead. We understand that it is inevitable while
cryptography is utilized. Our aim in this paper is to
propose a more efficient approach for using identity-
based deniable authentication, where we allow most
of computational overhead to be handled on a offline
phase and a signing process becomes very efficient.
In 1989, Even, Goldreich and Micali introduced
the notion of online/offline signature (Even et al.
1989). It was designed to provide a fast signature gen-
eration, which can be applied to portable device ap-
plications like smart card applications. The main idea
is to split the signature generation into two phases:
offline phase and online phase. Before the actual mes-
sage is ready, the signing algorithm runs in the offline
phase and the most signature computation is done
in this phase. Once the signing message is available,
the signing algorithm runs in the online phase and
retrieves the stored results of the offline phase to sign
the real message.
In 2000, chameleon hash function was intro-
duced by Krawczyk and Rabin (Krawczyk et al.
2000). Based on a chameleon hash function, Shamir
and Tauman (Shamir et al. 2001) proposed a new
“hash-sign-switch” paradigm to achieve more efficient
online/offline signature scheme compared with the
scheme due to Even, Goldreich and Micali. How-
ever, Shamir and Tauman’s online/offline signature
scheme suffers from the limitation of key exposure
due to using a traditional chameleon hash function.
This means that a recipient can possibly obtain a hash
collision and use it to recover the sender’s trapdoor
information, i.e., the secret key. In the case of key
exposure, the recipient can forge any signature. To
avoid this problem, Chen et al. (Chen et al. 2007)
proposed an improved online/offline signature scheme
without key exposure, which solved the key exposure
problem. Unfortunately, this signature scheme is not
identity-based.
Our contributions are outlined as follows.
• Construction of novel ID-based on-line/off-line
signature scheme without key exposure. Utilizing
an existing ID-based deniable signature scheme
and our ID-based chameleon hash without key
exposure based on Shamir-Tauman’s “hash-sign-
switch” paradigm, we construct an ID-based on-
line/offline signature scheme without key expo-
sure.
• Applications for Mitigating Phishing. Our ID-
based online/offline signature scheme is applica-
ble to the authentication of email system. ID-
based property simplifies the key generation and
deployment. Our ID-based online/offline signa-
ture scheme without key exposure can be inte-
grated into the SEFAP system (Ren et al. 2007).
The rest of this paper is organized as follows.
In Section 2, we review the cryptographic tools and
notions required throughout this paper and present
our generic ID-based online/offline signature scheme
without key exposure. In Section 3, based on our
scheme, we describe an implementation which has po-
tential applications in anti-phishing. In Section 4, we
described a new protocol to authenticate email for
anti-phishing. The final concluding remarks are given
in Section 5.
2 ID-based Online/Offline Signature Scheme
without Key Exposure
In this section, we present a novel ID-based on-
line/offline signature scheme without key exposure.
Shamir-Tauman’s “hash-sign-switch” paradigm was
based on the chameleon hash function. According to
chameleon hash’s property, no one except the holder
of the information can easily generate a hash col-
lision hash(m′, r′) = hash(m, r). As the trapdoor
holder, the signer can finish the most computation,
like the calculation of hash value based on a ran-
dom pair message-integer(m, r) and signature gener-
ation on the hash value, in the offline phase. There-
fore, the computation in online phase is less and
the signing process is efficient. Using the ID-based
chameleon hash function extended in (Ren et al.
2007), our ID-based online/offline signature scheme
eliminates the key exposure limitation from Shamir-
Tauman’s “hash-sign-switch” paradigm. Our ID-
based online/offline signature scheme is a construc-
tion through combining any efficient secure deniable
signature scheme and our ID-based chameleon hash
function without key exposure and with properties of
fast signing, non-repudiation and non-transferability
for the authentication of email systems with preserved
privacy.
2.1 Bilinear Pairings
Let G1,G2 be cyclic additive groups with a prime
q generated by P1, P2, respectively. Let GM be a
cyclic multiplicative group with the same order q. We
assume there is an isomorphism ψ : G2 → G1 such
that ψ(P2) = P1. Let ê : G1×G2 → GM be a bilinear
mapping with the following properties:
1. Bilinearity: ê(aP, bQ) = ê(P,Q)ab for all P ∈
G1, Q ∈ G2, a, b,∈ Zq.
2. Non-degeneracy: There exists P ∈ G1, Q ∈ G2
such that ê(P, Q) 6= 1.
3. Computability: There exists an efficient algo-
rithm to compute ê(P,Q) for all P ∈ G1, Q ∈ G2.
For simplicity, hereafter, we set G1 = G2 and P1 =
P2. We note that our scheme can be easily modified
for a general case, when G1 6= G2. Bilinear pairing
instance generator is defined as a probabilistic poly-
nomial time algorithm IG that takes as input a se-
curity parameter ` and returns a uniformly random
tuple param = (p,G1,GM , ê, P ) of bilinear parame-
ters, including a prime number p of size `, a cyclic
additive group G1 of order q, a multiplicative group
GM of order q, a bilinear map ê : G1 × G1 → GM
and a generator P of G1. For a group G of prime
order, we denote the set G∗ = G\{O} where O is the
identity element of the group.
2.2 ID-based Chameleon Hash
Definition 1 (ID-based Chameleon Hash) An ID-
based chameleon hashing scheme consists of four effi-
ciently computable algorithms (Setup, Extract, Hash,
Forge):
• Setup: Private Key Generator (PKG) takes as
input a security parameter λ, generates a pair of
master secret key MSK and master public key
MPK, and publishes master public key MPK
and public parameters.
• Extract: A deterministic algorithm that, on in-
put MSK and an identity string ID, outputs the
trapdoor information SID corresponding to the
identity.
• Hash: A probabilistic algorithm accepts MPK,
an identity string ID, a message m and a random
number r ∈ Z∗q , and outputs a hashed value h =
Hash(MPK, ID, m, r).
• Forge: For any valid hash value h, an algorithm
F accepts inputs MPK, the corresponding trap-
door information SID associated with ID, a mes-
sage m′, and a hash value h of a message m, and
r, outputs r′ that satisfies
Hash(MPK, ID, m′, r′) = Hash(MPK, ID,m, r)
Note that a public key associated with an Identity
String ID can be efficiently calculated by anyone us-
ing the public parameters. An ID-based chameleon
hashing scheme has the following properties:
• Collosion resistance: There exists no proba-
bilistic polynomial time algorithmA that accepts
as inputs a message m, a random integer r, an-
other message m′ 6= m, and a public key QID as-
sociated with ID, and outputs a random integer
r′ 6= r that satisfies Hash(MPK, ID,m′, r′) =
Hash(MPK, ID, m, r), with non-negligible prob-
ability.
• Trapdoor collisions: There exists an efficient
algorithm F that accepts as inputs a trapdoor in-
formation SID associated with an Identify String
ID, a pair of a message m and a random number
r, and another message m′ 6= m, outputs r′ that
satisfies
Hash(MPK, ID, m′, r′) = Hash(MPK, ID, m, r)
• Semantic security: From the hash value it is
infeasible to determine which message is likely
to have resulted in such value by an application
of the hash algorithm.
2.3 An Efficient ID-based Chameleon Hash
without key exposure
An efficient ID-based chameleon hash scheme with-
out key exposure is introduced in this sub-section.
This ID-based chameleon hash scheme not only has
all the properties of a general ID-based chameleon
hash scheme, but also prevents any third party from
recovering the trapdoor holder’s private key (SID)
even after a hash collision was forged by the receiver.
Moreover, in that deniable signature scheme, it pre-
vents a signer from generating a hash collision using
any information based on the existing hash value. To
incorporate our Online/Offline scheme, in our hash
scheme, the trapdoor information holder is the signer.
The scheme is described as follows.
¦ Setup: PKG chooses a random number s ∈ Z∗q
as a master secret key and sets Ppub = sP ∈ G
as the corresponding master public key. Define
cryptographic hash functions H0:{0, 1}∗ → G ,
h1:{0, 1}∗ → Z∗q . Let ê : G × G → GM be
a pairing. PKG publishes {G, GM , ê, q, κ, p,
Ppub, H0, h1} as system parameters and keeps s
which is known only to itself.
¦ Extract: User submits his identity information
ID to PKG. PKG computes the user’s pub-
lic key as QID = H0(ID), and returns SID =
s−1QID to the user as his private key.
¦ Hash: Given a message m, chooses a random
integer r ∈ Z∗q , an identity string ID, lets B =
ê(P,H0(ID)) and C=ê(Ppub,H0(ID)), computes
(Br, Cr), outputs a hash value
h = Hash(MPK, ID, m,Br, Cr) = Bh1(m)Cr
= ê(P, H0(ID))h1(m)ê(Ppub,H0(ID))r.
¦ Forge: For any valid hash value h, an algorithm
F accepts inputs MPK, a trapdoor information
SID associated with identity string ID, another
message m′ 6= m, and a hash value h of a message
m, Br and Cr, outputs Br
′
and Cr
′
Hash(MPK, ID,m′, Br
′
, Cr
′
)
= Hash(MPK, ID, m, Br, Cr),
where
Br
′
= Br ê(P, SID)(h1(m)−h1(m
′)),
Cr
′
= CrB(h1(m)−h1(m
′))
Note that
Hash(MPK, ID,m′, Br
′
, Cr
′
) = Bh1(m
′)Cr
′
= Bh1(m
′)CrB(h1(m)−h1(m
′))
= Hash(MPK, m, Br, Cr)
and < B, C, Br
′
, Cr
′
> is a valid Diffie-Hellman
tuple. Therefore, the forgery is successful.
The scheme has the property against revealing the
trapdoor information to any third party if a collision
forgery happened. This can be easily proved: colli-
sion forgery results in any third party to recover the
information ê(P, SID):
Br
′
/Br = ê(P, SID)(h1(m)−h1(m
′))
= ê(P, QID)s
−1(h1(m)−h1(m′))
If s−1 can be recovered, then discrete log prob-
lem is not intractable. Recalling the definition of
SID = s−1QID, we can easily reduce ê(P, SID) =
ê(P,QID)s
−1
. However, any third party could not re-
cover the trapdoor information SID from ê(P, SID)
. Hence, the holder of the trapdoor information can
still surely use the secret key at anytime and anywhere
after hash collision happened.
2.4 The Online/Offline Signature Scheme
In this section, we follow Shamir-Tauman’s “Hash-
Sign-Switch” paradigm (Shamir et al. 2001) to pro-
pose a much more efficient online/offline signature
scheme. Compared with Chen et al. (Naor 2004), the
advantage of Ren-Mu-Susilo’s ID-based Chameleon
Hash (Ren et al. 2007) is private key exposure-
freeness in identity based system which is more prac-
tical. However, if we directly apply Ren-Mu-Susilo’s
ID-based Chameleon Hash (Ren et al. 2007) to our on-
line/offline signature scheme, it requires to compute
the chameleon hash value in the offline phase every
time. To reduce the computation in the offline phase,
we proposed a new ID-based chameleon hash scheme
extended in (Ren et al. 2007) to make the chameleon
hash value reusable. Compared with traditional
chameleon signature scheme, in the online/offline sig-
nature scheme, the sender is the holder of the trap-
door information instead of the receiver. Ren-Mu-
Susilo’s ID-based Chameleon Hash (Ren et al. 2007)
is not designed for the online/offline signature scheme.
In that scheme, the receiver is the holder of the trap-
door information and the unique event δ require-
ment is used to guarantee the sender can not gener-
ate collision forgery after the receiver forges the col-
lision. Hence, to achieve more efficient general on-
line/offline scheme, we extended Ren-Mu-Susilo’s ID-
based Chameleon Hash (Ren et al. 2007) by remov-
ing the unique event δ requirement since signer is the
holder of the trapdoor information and it is unneces-
sary to prevent a signer from re-using the hash value
for a receiver. The main idea is that the chameleon
hash scheme is private key exposure-freeness and the
hash value can be securely reused. The most com-
putation can be done in system setup and the offline
phase. Hence, the signature can be efficiently gener-
ated in the online phase. Since the proposed ID-based
chameleon hash scheme has no key exposure problem
and also allows the reuse of the hash value, the hash
value can be set in a system parameter generation
phase.
The proposed ID-based online/offline signature
scheme consists of four efficient algorithms as follow-
ing:
¦ Parameters Setup: It consists of signature sys-
tem setup and chameleon hash system setup.
1. ID-based Signature Scheme Setup
Let SG be a signature system parameters
generation algorithm, SS be a signature
signing algorithm and SV be a signature
verification algorithm. Then, (SG, SS,
SV ) presents any secure ID-based signature
scheme. Let SP s be the public system pa-
rameters of the signature scheme.
2. Chameleon Scheme Setup
Let G be the cyclic additive groups gener-
ated P with a prime order q. Let GM be
a cyclic multiplicative group with the same
order q. Let ê : G×G→ GM be a bilinear
mapping. PKG chooses a random number
s ∈ Z∗q as master secret key MSK, which
is only kept by itself, and sets Ppub = sP
∈ G as master public key MPK. Define
cryptographic hash functions H0:{0, 1}∗ →
G , h1:{0, 1}∗ → Z∗q . Let r be a random
number from Z∗q , m be a message, IDs be
a specified signer’s identity string, and the
ID-based chameleon hash function Hc is de-
fined as follows:
Hc(MPK, IDs,m,Br, Cr) = Bh1(m)Cr
Where
B = ê(P, H0(IDs)), C = ê(Ppub,H0(IDs))
and < B, C,Br, Cr > is a valid Diffie-
Hellman tuple.
Let SPhc be the chameleon hash scheme’s
public system parameters: {G, GM , ê, q, `,
P , Ppub, H0, h1, Hc }. The public system
parameters of the Online/Offline scheme are
SP = {SPs, SPhc}.
¦ Key Extraction:
1. Signing Private Key Extraction. On input a
security parameter k and an identity string
IDs, runs the key generation algorithm of
the signature scheme, outputs the signing
private key (SKS).
2. Chameleon Scheme Private Key Extraction.
On input an identity string IDs, computes
public key QIDs = H0(IDs), runs the Key
Extract algorithm of the chameleon hash
scheme to obtain trapdoor key SIDs =
s−1QIDs , computes D = ê(P, SIDs).
3. Compute B = ê(P, H0(IDs)) and
C = ê(Ppub, H0(IDs)) stored as con-
stants, choose at random number r0 ∈ Z∗q
and a message m0, compute (Br0 , Cr0),
and output a hash value
h = Hash(MPK, ID,m0, Br0 , Cr0)
= Bh1(m0)Cr0
4. Store tuple (m0, B, C,D, Br0 , Cr0 , h).
¦ Signature Generation:
1. Offline Phase
Retrieve the hash value h, run the signing
algorithm SS with the key SKs associated
with the identify string IDs to sign h, out-
put partial signature σi ← SS(h) on the
message m0, and store σi, where i denotes
each signing event.
2. Online Phase
Given a new message mi, retrieve the
associated pair (m0, Br0 , Cr0 , B, D, h, σi).
Compute
Bri = Br0D(h1(m0)−h1(mi)),
Cri = Cr0B(h1(m0)−h1(mi)).
Send the message-signature pair
(mi, Bri , Cri , σi) to a verifier.
¦ Signature Verification:
1. Compute the chameleon hash value as fol-
lowing:
h = Hc(MPK, IDs,mi, Bri , Cri)
= Bh1(m0)Cri ,
where
B = ê(P, H0(IDs)), C = ê(Ppub, H0(IDs)).
Check if < B,C, Bri , Cri > is a valid Diffie-
Hellman tuple. If yes, then it is correct.
Otherwise, it is an incorrect hash value.
2. Verify the partial signature σi with associ-
ated signature verification algorithm.
Note that
h = Hc(MPK, IDs,mi, Bri , Cri)
= Bh1(mi)Cri
= Bh1(mi)Cr0B(h1(m0)−h1(mi))
= Bh1(m0)Cr0
= Hc(MPK, IDs,m0, Br0 , Cr0).
3 Online/Offline Two-Party Ring Signature
In this section, we describe how to integrate the on-
line/offline notion into an efficient ID-based two-party
ring signature scheme. This scheme has potential ap-
plications in anti-phishing.
¦ Parameters Setup: It consists of signature sys-
tem setup and chameleon hash system setup as
following:
1. ID-based Signature System Setup
SG runs PKG to generate ring signature
scheme’s public global system params {Gs,
GMs , ês, qs, κ, ps, Ppubs , h01 , h11}, where
h10 : {0, 1}∗ → Gs, h11 : {0, 1}∗ → Zqs . Let
ês : Gs × Gs → GMs be a bilinear map-
ping. Choose a random number ss ∈ Z∗qs as
the master secret key and set Ppubs = ssPs
as the master public key. Let SP s be the
public system parameters of the signature
scheme: {Gs,GMs , ês, qs, κ, ps, Ppubs , h10,
h11}.
2. ID-based Chameleon System Setup
Recall the definition in Section 2.3. Let
SPhc be the chameleon hash scheme’s pub-
lic system parameters: { G, GM , ê, q, `,
P , Ppub, H0, h1, Hc }, where MSK=s ∈R
Z∗q , which is randomly chosen only kept by
itself, Ppub = sP ∈ G, H0:{0, 1}∗ → G ,
h1:{0, 1}∗ → Z∗q , ê : G × G → GM be a
pairing, and Hc is the ID-based chameleon
hash function. Let r be a random number
from Z∗q , m be a message, IDs be a specified
signer’s identity string, and the ID-based
chameleon hash function Hc is defined as
follows:
Hc(MPK, IDs,m, Br, Cr) = Bh1(m)Cr,
where
B = ê(P,H0(IDs)), C = ê(Ppub,H0(IDs))
and < B, C,Br, Cr > is a valid Diffie-
Hellman tuple.
For simplicity, hereafter, we set Ps = P
and Ppubs = Ppub. The public system pa-
rameters of an online/Offline scheme are
SP = {SPS , SPhc}.
¦ Key Extraction:
1. Signing Private Key Extraction
Given an identity information IDs, run
Extractor to compute QIDs = h
1
0(IDs) ∈
Z∗qs and return a secret key SKS=SIDs =
(ss+QIDs)
−1P ∈ G. Compute E = ê(P, P )
and store it.
2. Chameleon Scheme Private Key Extraction
On input an identity string IDs, compute
public key QIDs = H0(IDs), run the Key
Extract algorithm of the chameleon hash
scheme to obtain trapdoor key SIDs =
s−1QIDs , compute D = ê(P, SIDs).
3. Compute B = ê(P, H0(IDs)) and
C=ê(Ppub,H0(IDs)) stored as a con-
stant, choose at random number r0 ∈ Z∗q
and a message m0, compute (Br0 , Cr0),
and output a hash value
h = Hash(MPK, IDs,m0, Br0 , Cr0)
= Bh1(m0)Cr0 .
4. Store tuple (m0, B, C,D, Br0 , Cr0 , E, h).
¦ Signature Generation:
1. Offline Phase
Retrieve the hash value h and a constant
E, run the signing algorithm SS with the
key SKs associated with the identify string
IDs to sign h, output partial signature σi ←
SS(h) on the message m0, and store σi,
where i means each signing event.
SS: Given a hash value h and a constant
E, a set of identity string IDs (Sender’s ID
and Receiver’s ID). Choose a random inte-
ger rs ∈ Z∗qs and do the following:
− Compute Yk+1 = h11((h)||ê(Ps, rsPs)) ∈
Z∗qs , where k ∈ (0, 1), k denotes the
sender, and assume that k = 1, and
then get Yk+1 = Y0 and Ps = P1.
− Generate the forward ring sequence:
pick T0 ∈ Gs, compute
Yi+1 = h11((h)||ê(h10(IDi)Pi
+ Ppubi , Ti)E
Yi),
where i = 0.
− Compute Tk = (rsPs − YkPs)(s +
QIDs)
−1 = (rs−Yk)SIDk , where k = 1.
For simplicity, we assume P0 = P1.
The message-signature tuple is σi ←
{h, Y0, T0, T1}.
2. Online Phase
Given a new message mi, retrieve the
associated pair (m0, Br0 , Cr0 , B, D, h, σi).
Compute
Bri = Br0D(h1(m0)−h1(mi))
Cri = Cr0B(h1(m0)−h1(mi))
Send the message-signature pair
(mi, Bri , Cri , σi) to a verifier.
¦ Signature Verification:
1. Compute the chameleon hash value as fol-
lowing:
h = Hc(MPK, IDs,mi, Bri , Cri)
= Bh1(m0)Cri ,
where
B = ê(P, H0(IDs)), C = ê(Ppub,H0(IDs)).
Check if < B,C, Bri , Cri > is a valid Diffie-
Hellman tuple. If yes, it is then correct.
Otherwise, it is an incorrect hash value.
2. Verify the partial signature σi with associ-
ated signature verification algorithm.
To verify the signature, retrieve system pa-
rameters E = ê(P, P ), and compute
Yi+1 = h11((h)||ê(h10(IDi)Pi +Ppubi , Ti)EYi)
for i ∈ {0, 1}, Accept if Y2 = Y0.
Thus
Y1 = h11((h)||ê(h10(ID0)P0 + Ppub0 , T0)EY0),
Y2 = h11((h)||ê(h10(ID1)P1 + Ppubs , T1)EY1).
3. Correctness.
Tk = T1 = (rsPs − YkPs)(ss + QIDs)−1
= (rs − Y1)SIDs .
Y2 = h11((h)||ê(h10(ID1)P1 + Ppub1 , T1)EY1)
= h11((h)||ê((h10(ID1) + s)Ps, (rsPs − Y1Ps)
(s + QID1)
−1)EY1)
= h11((h)||ê(Ps, rsPs − Y1Ps + Y1Ps)) = Y0.
4 Application to Email Systems
Using our ID-based online/offline signature scheme,
we can construct an efficient protocol for authentica-
tion in email systems. Assume that each email user
has his own certificate generated by his own email
server. The certificate is encrypted and can be stored
in kinds of forms like encrypted file, or USB device,
or smart card, and so on. The certificate contains
the setup information like online/offline signature sys-
tem parameters, user’s identity string and his private
key, which are generated though running the first two
phases of online/offline signature scheme. To authen-
ticate email’s origin, the sender has to sign the out-
going message with his private key. According to our
ID-based online/offline scheme, the signature gener-
ation is performed in two phases: online phase and
offline phase. Before the sender clicks the send but-
ton, our scheme runs in the offline phase: signing
the stored chameleon hash value. As soon as the
real message is ready, our scheme performs the on-
line phase: computing the hash collision based on the
given message m. Since the online phase is efficient,
using our ID-based online/offline signature scheme is
much more applicable for email system authentica-
tion. The detail of this protocol is as follows.
Parameter Generation and Key Extraction
1. Alice chooses email address and registers as an
legal email user.
2. Based on Alice identity string, the email server
runs the parameter generation and key extrac-
tion algorithms of our ID-based online/offline sig-
nature scheme to generate Alice’s certificate and
deliveries it back to Alice with a secure channel.
The certificate includes the system parameters
of the current ID-based online/offline signature
scheme and Alice’s secret key.
The signing process is as described in the previous
section.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we consider the authentication of email
system for mitigating email-based phishing attacks.
To mitigate phishing by cryptography, the signature
scheme should be ID-based and should have prop-
erties non-repudiation and non-transferability to en-
hance sender’s privacy. The efficiency of the signature
scheme is one of the most important considerations
for email system. Online/offline signature scheme is
a good option to provide fast signing process since
the most computation is shifted to an offline phase
and signing real message in an online phase is ef-
ficient. However, based on the “hash-sign-switch”
paradigm (Shamir et al. 2001), online/offline signa-
ture schemes suffer from the key exposure issue. Our
ID-based chameleon hash function eliminates the key
exposure problem. With any secure ID-based deni-
able signature scheme and our ID-based chameleon
hash function without key exposure, we proposed an
ID-based online/offline signature scheme without key
exposure which also can be applied to many areas.
Compared with previous signature schemes for anti-
phishing, our ID-based online/offline two-signer ring
signature scheme is applicable to authentication in
email systems
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